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NOTE
HARMONIOUS MEETING: THE McCLAIN DECISION
AND THE CULTURAL PROPERTY
IMPLEMENTATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
In recent years a burgeoning illicit trade in art has sparked the
global pillage of archaeological sites.' After a decade of opposition
from art dealers, 2 Congress passed the Cultural Property Implementa-
tion Act (CPIA)3 in December 1982, to implement the 1970 UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export, and Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO Con-
vention).4 Under the CPIA, the United States agrees to join other art-
importing nations in levying import controls over archaeological and
ethnological materials that are in jeopardy from pillage. 5 In an emer-
gency, the United States may impose controls unilaterally.
6
With the passage of the CPIA, a new issue has emerged. United
States art dealers and their political representatives now claim the
1977 construction and application of an existing U.S. statute, the
1. See generally K. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST (1973); Bator, An Essay on the
International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982); Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-
Columbian Antiquities, 29 Art J. 94 (1969).
2. The legislative history documents a decade of controversy between art dealers and
representatives of the U.S. government, the museum community, archaeologists and
anthropologists. Legal scholars and advisors to the various constituencies also participated
in the years of debate. Between the original bill proposed in 1973, and the final version of
the CPIA passed on Dec. 21, 1982, five successive bills, representing varying degrees of
revision, entered Congress. See 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4078.
3. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446,
§§ 301-315, 96 Stat. 2350-63 (1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613
(1983)) [hereinafter cited as CPIA]. The CPIA was enacted Jan. 12, 1983.
4. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter cited as UNESCO Convention].
5. The CPIA defines archaelogical material as an object of cultural significance at
least two hundred and fifty years old and normally discovered as a result of scientific exca-
vation, clandestine or accidental digging, or exploration on land or under water. An ethno-
logical object is the product of a tribal or nonindustrial society that is important to a
people's cultural heritage because of the object's characteristics, comparative rarity, or con-
tribution to the knowledge of the origins and history of that people. 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(i)-
(ii) (1982).
6. Id. §§ 2602-2603.
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National Stolen Property Act (NSPA),7 by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. McClain,8 is inconsistent with
U.S. law, the CPIA, and the aims of the UNESCO Convention. 9
The NSPA imposes criminal liability on anyone who transports
stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce, knowing it is sto-
len.10 In United States v. McClain, the Fifth Circuit applied the
NSPA to pre-Columbian smuggled artifacts from Mexico.I The
court held that the NSPA applied where a foreign nation had by law
clearly declared objects to be government property and where export
regulations also forbade their removal from the country.'
2
Critics charge that under McClain, the NSPA accepts all foreign
ownership laws as valid and violates the CPIA's mandate for multilat-
eral control of the pillage of archaeological sites. The critics fear that
the NSPA, as construed under McClain, could restrict the U.S. art
market and subject U.S. dealers to criminal liability.' 3 Congress is
currently considering legislation which would effectively remove cul-
tural property from the reach of the NSPA 14 and thus nullify
McClain. While the bill remains in Committee, the controversy over
McClain's validity and its consistency with the CPIA and United
States policy toward the illegal art trade continues.'
7. National Stolen Property Act, ch. 33, § 3, 48 Stat. 794 (1934) (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as NSPA].
8. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 [McClain I], reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th
Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) [McClain H], cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979).
9. A Bill to Amend the National Stolen Property Act, Relating to Stolen Archaeological
Property, 1985: Hearing on S. 605 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on S.
605]; S. 605, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S2611-12 (daily ed. March 6, 1985); H.
10755, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 515,987, (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982); Fitzpat-
rick, A Wayward Course: the Lawless Customs Policy Toward Cultural Properties, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL., 857 (1983); McAlee, The McClain Case, Customs, and Con-
gress, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813 (1983). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1982).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
11. McClain , 545 F.2d 988.
12. Id. at 1000-01.
13. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9.
14. S. 605, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S2611-12 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1985).
The Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on this
bill on May 22, 1985. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9.
15. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9. (Statements of Sen. Paul Laxalt; Sen. Daniel
Patrick Moynihan; Sen. Strom Thurmond; Sen. Charles Mathias; Sen. Orrin Hatch; Sen.
Joseph Biden; Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal Adviser, Educational, Cultural and Public
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State; Paul M. Bator, Professor of Law, Harvard Univ. (now Profes-
sor of Law, University of Chicago); Thomas E. Harvey, General Counsel and Congres-
sional Liaison, U.S. Information Agency; Richard H. Abbey, Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs
Service; Maureen Robinson, American Ass'n of Museums; Dr. Albert A. Dekin, Jr., Chair,
Governmental Affairs Comm., Society for American Archaeology; Thomas Solley, Direc-
tor, Indiana Univ. Art Museum; Douglas C. Ewing, President, American Ass'n of Dealers
in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art; Bernard V. Bothmer, American Ass'n of Dealers in
Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art; James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
HARMONIOUS MEETING
This Note will show that the McClain construction of the NSPA
is fully consistent with U.S. law, with internationally recognized legal
doctrines, and with the CPIA and the UNESCO Convention. Section
I briefly describes the problem of pillage and summarizes U.S. efforts
to control the illicit art trade. Section II presents the McClain holding
and shows its consistency both with U.S. law and with legal doctrine
and practice in other nations. Section III analyzes and responds to
arguments of critics that McClain is inconsistent with congressional
policy in the CPIA, and that the U.S. Customs Service and the State
Department are enforcing the NSPA and other U.S. measures in con-
travention of the CPIA. Section IV explores the value of the NSPA in
furthering U.S. policy and shows its harmony with other U.S. and
international efforts to control the illicit art trade.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE PROBLEM OF PILLAGE
The illicit trade in art has reached crisis proportions. Described
in a recent news article as "a blitzkrieg on historical sites around the
world,"16 this vandalism may soon strip all known archaeological sites
around the world to feed a multi-million dollar market "that subsi-
dizes looting despite an array of federal, state, and international laws"
which prohibit this plunder. 17 Scholars calculate that the United
States accounts for at least half of the market for pre-Columbian art,18
nearly all of which has been smuggled from Mexico, Central America,
eral, U.S. Dep't of Justice. See Replies of U.S. Dep't of State to Subcomm. on Criminal
Law, Senate Judiciary Comm., Nov. 29, 1985; see also Letter from Secretary of the Interior
to Senator Strom Thurmond, (undated) (opposing the passage of S. 605) [on file at the
Cornell International Law Journal]; Letter from Douglas Ewing to the N.Y. Times, Mar.
5, 1986, at A26, col. 5.
16. Wellborn, When Greedy Collectors Plunder the Past, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 4, 1985, at 79.
17. Id.; see also Graham, Looters Rob Graves and History, National Geographic, April,
1986, at 453; Lowther, Robbing Ancient Graves, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 28, 1985, at 60; Press,
The Hot World of Stolen Art, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 1986, at 80, col. 1; Weingarten, Relics
Stolen From Mexico Museum Could Be on Underground Auction Block, Atlanta Constitu-
tion, Feb. 1, 1986, at 17, col. 1; Middle East Art Thefts Tied to Inflated Market, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at C15, col. 1; Span, Arresting Trend in Art, Washington Post, Jan. 7,
1986, at Cl, col. 5; Ugly Trade, L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 1986, at 4, col. 1; Ancient Art Stolen in
Mexico, Washington Post, Dec. 27, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
18. Those arts indigenous to the Americas, prior to the discovery of the continent by
Europeans, are usually referred to as 'pre-Columbian'. Pre-Columbian art includes pot-
tery, architecture, stone carving, textiles, metallurgy, and paintings, which are the product
of a pre-Columbian Indian culture of South America, Mexico, or Central America (i.e., the
Aztec, Mayan, and Inca civilizations). Recognition of the aesthetic importance of this art
has come only in the 20th century. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ART 908-23 (H.
Osborne ed. 1970).
19861
314 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
and the Andean republics of South America.19 Recent years have seen
a dramatic rise in the global theft of art and antiquities,20 accelerated
by the ominous use of new technologies that pinpoint rich archaeologi-
cal sites.2 '
Efforts to curb pillage and regulate the art trade must balance
competing values. Art-rich nations wish to preserve their cultural her-
itage, and often levy sweeping export controls and declare national
ownership of their cultural property to do So. 2 2 These measures con-
flict with the desires of dealers for a free international market in art
and with the aesthetic, scientific, and educational benefits which arise
from unrestricted international circulation and exchange. 23 Yet as
looting increases, the historic context of objects vanishes. The
destruction of sites endangers both national heritage and global under-
standing of ancient cultures. The need for more effective controls
seems clear.
The United States, in its efforts to control the illicit trade in art,
has attempted to assert the values of both preservation and free
trade.24 Until recently the dealers have had the benefit of this balance,
because growing U.S. awareness of the need for preservation has taken
time to implement.25 Now, however, the CPIA may enable the United
States to control the import of endangered archaeological or ethnolog-
ical materials. 26 Furthermore, the U.S. Customs Service is applying
the McClain construction of the NSPA to prevent pre-Columbian art
19. Cultural Property Treaty Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 3403 Before the Subcomm.
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1979) (state-
ment of Dr. Clemency Coggins, Chairperson, Archaeological Institute of America);
MEYER, supra note 1.
20. MEYER, supra note 1, at 12; Bator, supra note 1, at 177, 280-94 and accompanying
notes. "According to the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR), ... [i]n 1982
museums, galleries and private collectors reported 2,981 thefts of art and antiquities to the
IFAR, and only 283 recoveries; by 1984 robberies were up to 4,157 and recoveries down to
160." Press, supra note 17, at 60.
21. Satellite Maps Make Plunder Easy, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 7, 1985, at 5, col.
5.
22. Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a Common Cul-
tural Heritage, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 757, 758 (1983); Bator, supra note 1, at 294-
310, "Mexican legislation provides a striking example of restrictive legislation. .. .";
Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property, 19 INT'L LAw. 835,
845 (1985). See also Mexico's ownership law of 1972 in Ley Federal Sobre Monumentos y
Zonas Arqueologicas, Artisticas e Historicas, 312 Diario Official D.O. [16] (1972).
23. Merryman, supra note 22, at 759; Bator, supra note 1, at 295.
24. Merryman, supra note 22, at 760-62; see generally, Bator, supra note I.
25. See NSPA, supra note 7; Act to Prevent Importation of Pre-Columbian Sculpture
and Murals, Pub. L. No. 92-587, §§ 201-205, 86 Stat. 1296 (1972) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2091-2095 (1982) [hereinafter cited at Pre Columbian Act]); Archaeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, §§ 2-13, 93 Stat. 721 (1979) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 470 aa.-ll. (1985) [hereinafter cited as ARPA]; see also infra notes 52-56, 81-88
and accompanying text.




owned by foreign countries from crossing the U.S. border.27 These
measures have provoked U.S. dealers to claim that the NSPA is incon-
sistent with the CPIA and have engendered the bill to repeal
McClain.28 Repeal would free dealers from the threat of criminal
prosecution for importing stolen art and assuage their fears that U.S.
regulation may deflect their market in these antiquities to other
countries. 29
B. U.S. EFFORTS TO REGULATE THE ILLICIT ART TRADE
1. International Measures
The United States attempts to control the illicit art trade through
international, national, and municipal remedies. In the international
arena, the United States regulates cultural property through four bilat-
eral agreements and an international treaty. A 1972 Treaty with Mex-
ico 30 and a 1981 Executive Agreement with Peru31 obligate the United
States to help those countries recover stolen cultural property through
existing U.S. civil and criminal laws. In May, 1984, the United States
signed a similar Executive Agreement with Guatemala, 32 and an
Agreement with Ecuador awaits ratification by that country.3 3 The
most important U.S. contribution to the international r~gulation of
cultural property, however, is U.S. entry into the UNESCO Conven-
tion through passage of the CPIA.
The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation began active work toward an international convention to con-
trol the illicit trade in cultural property in 1968.3 4 The UNESCO
27. See McAlee, supra note 9, at 815, 829-38; Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 858, 864-93.
28. Hearing on S.605, supra note 9; 131 Cong. Rec. S2611-12 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1985);
McAlee, supra note 9, at 827, 836; Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 864, 865.
29. See Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 (testimony of Sen. Moynihan, Douglas Ewing).
30. Treaty of Cooperation for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, His-
torical, and Cultural Property, July 17, 1970, United States-Mexico, 22 U.S.T. 494,
T.I.A.S. No. 7088.
31. Agreement Respecting the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Histori-
cal, and Cultural Properties, Sept. 15, 1981, United States-Peru, -U.S.T.-, T.I.A.S. No.
10136.
32. Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and
Cultural Properties, May 21, 1984, United States-Guatemala, -U.S.T.--, T.I.A.S. No. -.
33. Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and
Cultural Properties, Nov. 17, 1983, United States-Ecuador, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -
- (not in force).
34. Bator, supra note 1, at 371; Note, The Legal Response to the Illicit Movement of
Cultural Property, 5 LAW & POL. INT'L. Bus., 932, 949-50 (1973).
An early draft, which the United States rejected, emphasized the nationalistic interests of
the art-exporting countries. UNESCO Revised Draft Convention Concerning the Means of
Prohibiting the Illicit Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970, art.
7(a)-(e), printed in MEANS OF PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING THE ILLICIT IMPORT,
EXPORT AND TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, UNESCO Doe.
SHC/MP/5, Annex III (1970). Known as the "Secretariat Draft," the document imposed
1986]
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member countries adopted the Convention's final draft in 1970. 35 The
United States supported entry into the UNESCO Convention in
1972,36 but did not become a member until 1983, when the CPIA,
which authorized U.S. entry, finally became law.37 Furthermore, the
United States endorsed the UNESCO Convention with important
qualifications and accepted only certain provisions of the Treaty. 38
Article 9, the crux of the UNESCO Convention, is a brief and
general provision that covers archaeological or ethnographic materials
which are in jeopardy from pillage.39 Under this article, parties under-
take "to participate in a concerted international effort to determine
and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the con-
trol of exports and imports and international commerce" in cultural
materials. Each state shall, pending agreement, "take provisional
measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the
cultural heritage of the requesting state."'4
0
Article 6 of the UNESCO Convention provides for a system of
export controls including state certification of cultural materials
authorized for export.4 ' "[C]onsistent with national legislation," arti-
cle 7 of the Convention requires nations to prevent museums and simi-
lar institutions from acquiring property illegally exported from other
countries.42 Parties to the Convention also agree to return property
stolen from museums and other institutions to the state of origin upon
request, provided the requesting state pays compensation to an inno-
cent purchaser or person with valid title to the property.43
sweeping export and import controls, defined cultural property as "all property which is
important for history," and contained an "all or nothing clause" that forbade reservations
to the Convention. See Bator, supra note 1, at 371-72; Note, supra, at 949-55. The Con-
vention's final text represented a more realistic balance of interests between the art-source
countries and the art-importing nations. For accounts of the U.S. position and the legisla-
tive process that led to the final text, see Bator, supra note 1, at 343-44, 370-84; Note, supra,
at 956-63. The major U.S. contribution was a "crisis" provision, which authorized affirma-
tive measures and controls by member nations implemented on an ad hoc basis when a
state's cultural heritage is jeopardized by the removal of cultural property highly important
to the national patrimony. See Bator, supra note 1, at 355, 373, 379; Note, supra, at 958.
35. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, 92d Cong., 2d. Sess. 17 (1972), [hereinafter cited as "S.
EXEC. REP. No. 29].
36. The Senate gave its advice and consent on August 11, 1972. 118 CONG. REc.
27,924-25 (1972).
37. See CPIA, supra note 3.
38. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 9. For a discussion of the U.S. qualifica-
tions to understandings of its endorsement of the Convention, see Note, supra note 34, at
964-67.
39. UNESCO Convention, supra note 4, art. 9.
40. Id.
41. Id. art. 6(a)-(b).
42. Id. art. 7(a).
43. Id. art. 7(b). Other provisions of the Convention provide for national inventories
and dealer lists to identify art for purposes of control. Id. arts. 5(b), 10(a).
[Vol. 19:311
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As mentioned, the United States modified several of its provisions
in endorsing the UNESCO Convention. The United States reserved
the right to decide unilaterally whether to impose export controls on
its own cultural property.44 The United States further qualified its
adoption of the Convention with several "understandings. '45 First,
the Senate emphasized that the Convention is neither self-executing
nor retroactive.46 This qualification created the need for implementing
legislation (the CPIA). The Senate also stated that Article 7(a),
prohibiting the acquisition of illegally exported materials by museums
and similar institutions, applies only to institutions whose acquisition
policy is subject to national control.47 Since practically all U.S. muse-
ums are private, this qualification exempts most U.S. institutions from
Article 7(a).48 Concerned that acceptance of the UNESCO Conven-
tion not impinge on U.S. laws, the United States explicitly linked
acceptance of the UNESCO Convention to the maintenance of
existing domestic penal remedies, including the NSPA.49 For exam-
ple, the United States emphasized that acceptance of Article 7(b)
prohibiting the import of property stolen from museums, "does not
affect existing remedies available in state and federal courts."
'50
44. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 9. Paul Bator notes: "It was clear from the
beginning that the United States could not and would not give up the right to decide for
itself whether and when to apply export controls over works of art .. " Bator, supra note
1, at 377.
45. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 9.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. The Library of Congress and the National Archives are subject to federal control.
The Smithsonian Institution is governed by a board of regents. The Smithsonian considers
itself a semiprivate organization. Note, supra note 34, at 965 n.213. Paul Bator, however,
regards article 7(a) as applicable to the Smithsonian. Bator, supra note 1, at 362 n.148.
49. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 21 (Letter of Submittal to the Senate from
the Department of State, Nov. 11, 1971). The U.S. State Department responded to a Con-
vention requirement that states impose sanctions on persons violating the prohibition
against importing stolen property under Article 7(b) by noting that "[t]he laws of the
United States and presumably the laws of most states, prohibit the theft and the receipt and
transportation of stolen property." Id. The letter states the U.S. position that the NSPA
and the U.S. Customs statute that triggers its application are consistent with and will assist
in the enforcement of the UNESCO Convention's mandates. (Section 545 would apply
"Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2314-15 [NSPA] .... Title 18 United States Code,
to willful violations of Article 7(b) when that provision is implemented by statute"). Id.
(18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976) provides: "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings
into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells,
or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise
after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.")
50. S. EXEC. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 20 (Letter of Submittal to the Senate from
the Department of State, Nov. 11, 1971). Art. 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention
requires member states "at the request of the State Party of origin to take appropriate steps
to recover and return any such cultural property imported after the entry into force of this
convention in both states concerned, provided, however, that the requesting state shall pay
just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that prop-
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Although it accepted only aspects of the Convention, the United
States endorsed the Convention's central provision, the mandate for
both multilateral and unilateral efforts to control pillage.51 Thus, the
United States committed itself to the principle of protection of cultural
property on an international scale.
2. National Legislation
Besides international treaties and agreements, four U.S. statutes
seek to combat the illicit trade in cultural property.
a. The Pre-Columbian Act of 1972
Passage of the Pre-Columbian Act of 197252 represented a unilat-
eral initiative by the United States to stop the dismemberment of mon-
umental pre-Columbian stelae. 53 The Act prohibits the import of
illegally exported "pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculp-
tures or murals." 54 Unlike state property laws or national criminal
law, the Act does not require that the sculptures or murals be stolen,
only that they be "subject to export control by the country of ori-
gin." 55 Failure to produce a certificate from the country of origin
authorizing export results in detention at the border and, if authoriza-
tion is not forthcoming, the United States seizes the art and offers to
return it to its home country.
56
b. The Cultural Property Implementation Act
The Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA)57 implements
erty." Id. at 9. The Senate mandated that acceptance of this obligation is "without preju-
dice to other remedies, civil or penal, for the recovery of stolen cultural property to the
rightful owner without compensation." Id.
In other qualifications, the U.S. declined to establish national mechanisms to oversee
preservation activities and refused to require its dealers to maintain a list of property sold
with information about origins and price. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 19-
20 (Letter of Submittal to the Senate from the Department of State, Nov. 11, 1971). The
State Department position was that the National Park Service of the Department of Inte-
rior, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives have responsibilities for the pro-
tection of cultural property. Id. See also Note, supra note 34, at 966 n.215; UNESCO
Convention, supra note 4, art. 5. For the U.S. position on regulation of antique dealers, see
S. EXEc. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 22 n.106.
51. S. ExEc. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 9. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
52. Pre-Columbian Act, supra note 25.
53. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1982). "Stelae are monumental stone slabs, usually
carved with both pictures and hieroglyphs, erected in ceremonial centers." Bator, supra
note 1, at 278 n.4. See also Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, 175 Sc. 263 (1972).
54. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1982).
55. Id. § 2095(3)(A)(iii).
56. Id. § 2093.
57. CPIA, supra note 3.
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articles 9 and 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention.58 The Act's provi-
sions are far more detailed and qualified than the UNESCO mandate
which it implements. Sections 303 and 30459 specifically interpret the
general mandate of Article 9 for "concerted international action" to
assist a party whose "cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of
archaeological or ethnological materials. ' 60 These two sections apply
only to archaeological or ethnographic materials over 250 years old 6
1
and respond only to situations of jeopardy or emergency. 62 Section
303 allows the United States to impose import controls in concert with
other art-importing nations if it finds that these materials are in jeop-
ardy from pillage.63 Section 304 allows the United States to impose
controls unilaterally in an emergency.
64
Both these sections set rigorous conditions under which the
United States may act. 65 Under Section 303, the state party affected
must request assistance from the United States in writing, with factual
documentation. 66 Section 303 enumerates four other requirements for
Presidential authority to act: (1) that the requesting party's cultural
patrimony is in jeopardy; (2) that the affected state has tried to help
itself; (3) that import controls will be of substantial benefit, and less
drastic remedies are not available; (4) and that U.S. import controls be
applied in concert with similar restrictions by other art-importing
58. UNESCO Convention, supra note 4, arts. 9, 7(b).
59. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602, 2604 (1982).
60. UNESCO Convention, supra note 4, art. 9.
61. 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
62. Id. §§ 2602, 2604.
63. Id. § 2602. A limited exception to the requirement of multilateral action permits
the United States to enter into an agreement to bar importation of certain cultural property
in a non-emergency situation without full participation of art-importing nations if the Pres-
ident decides that the non-participating nation is "not essential to deter a serious situation
of pillage" and the import controls will have substantial benefit. Id.
64. Id. § 2604.
65. A Cultural Property Advisory Committee assists the President in his determination
of the conditions permitting either multinational or unilateral action. This Committee con-
sists of eleven members appointed by the President from constituencies representing the
archaeological and anthropological professions, dealers, museum officials, and the general
public. Id. § 2605. The Committee must make recommendations to the President on
whether to enter a bilateral or multilateral agreement with the requesting state party within
150 days. Id. §§ 2602(f)(3), 2605(f)(1). For an emergency request or a situation which the
Committee considers a crisis, the Committee must report within 90 days. Id.
§§ 2603(c)(2), 2605(f)(3). If the Committee recommends action, the President may nego-
tiate an agreement with the state party. Id. § 2602(f). If, contrary to the Committee's
recommendation, the President should decide not to enter an agreement to impose con-
trols, he is required by law to justify his action to Congress. Id. § 2602(g)(3).
66. Id. § 2602(a)(3). The first request under the CPIA has been received. Interest-
ingly, it comes not from a Latin-American country but from Canada, which in recent years
has suffered extensive loss of Iroquois and other North American Indian artifacts to looters
who steal the objects and sell them at high prices to dealers in the United States. See
generally News Release, "Canada Files First Request to U.S. for Protection of Endangered
Artifacts," U.S.I.A., Oct., 2, 1985. See also U.S.I.A. World, Dec. 1985, at 12, col. 1.
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nations.67 The United States may enter a bilateral agreement with the
requesting state party before other art-importing nations levy compa-
rable controls.68 If other such nations do not act similarly within a
reasonable period, however, the United States must suspend its import
controls.69 The requirement for multilateral action and for suspension
of U.S. controls if such action is not forthcoming respond to the con-
cern' of art dealers that "if we adopt stringent legislation, the art mar-
ket will simply shift elsewhere, to Europe or Japan .... -70
Yet significantly, the CPIA permits U.S. action even in the
absence of parallel controls by other art-importing nations.71 In this,
the CPIA transcends the requirement of UNESCO's Article 9, which
merely requests "provisional measures to the extent feasible."' 72 The
Act allows the United States to respond unilaterally in an emergency.
An emergency exists when archaeological or ethnological material is
(1) newly discovered and of importance for the understanding of the
history of mankind, and is in jeopardy from pillage, dismantling, dis-
persal, or fragmentation; (2) from a site of high cultural significance
and one which is in jeopardy of crisis proportion; or (3) part of the
remains of a culture or civilization whose record is in jeopardy of crisis
proportion.73 Application of import restrictions must reduce the
incentive for pillage, dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation. 74 The
emergency controls are temporary, but they may run for five years
with a possible three year extension. 75
After a multilateral agreement or unilateral emergency action is
in force, the Secretary of the Treasury must promulgate a list of the
controlled cultural materials and give fair notice of the restrictions to
importers and other interested persons. The U.S. Customs Service is
responsible for enforcing the import restrictions, 76 and promulgated
interim regulations in 1985 that apply the CPIA's provisions. 77
In contrast to the sections that cover only archaeological or eth-
nological materials, Section 308 of the CPIA implements Article 7(b)
of the UNESCO Convention by prohibiting the importation of all cul-
67. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1982).
68. Id. § 2602(a)(2)(A). Bilateral and multilateral agreements run for five years and
may be extended for five additional years. Id. §§ 2602(e), 2605(b).
69. Id. § 2602(d)(1)-(2).
70. Emmerich, Symposium: Legal Aspects of the International Traffic in Stolen Art, 4
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 51, 111 (1967).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982).
72. UNESCO Convention, supra note 4, art. 9.
73. 19 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(I)-(3) (1982).
74. Id. § 2603(a).
75. Id. § 2603(c)(3).
76. Id. § 2613.
77. 19 C.F.R. § 12 (1985). These regulations specify the criteria for documentation,
evidence, notice, time limits, forfeiture, and return of controlled cultural materials. Id.
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tural property stolen from a museum, religious or secular monument,
or similar institution. This banned cultural property must be docu-
mented as inventory of a museum or institution.78 If shown to have
been stolen, it is subject to forfeiture and return.79 Again, the U.S.
Customs Service is responsible for enforcement.80
c. The National Stolen Property Act
The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)81 prohibits the trans-
portation "in interstate or foreign commerce of any goods, wares, mer-
chandise,.., of the value of $5000 or more, knowing the same to have
been stolen, converted or taken by fraud."'82 The need for federal
action to control the movement of stolen goods in interstate and for-
eign commerce underlies the NSPA.83 In United States v. McClain,84
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the NSPA to pre-
Columbian artifacts illegally exported from a foreign country. The
court held that a foreign country can be an owner of property by legis-
lative declaration of ownership, without reducing the property to pos-
session. Proof of exportation after such declaration of ownership is
then sufficient to prove that the property is stolen and will trigger the
NSPA's penal sanctions.8"
78. The definition of cultural property follows art. 1 of the UNESCO Convention. 19
U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1982). Cultural property therefore refers not only to archaeological or
ethnographic objects but includes a broad range of materials, from art, sculpture, manu-
scripts, archives, and documents, to rare specimens or collections of flora, fauna, and min-
erals, and objects of palaeontological interest. UNESCO Convention, supra note 4, art.
l(a)-(k).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 2609 (1982). Section 3 10(a) mandates that any designated archaeologi-
cal material or article of cultural property which is imported into the United States in
violation of section 307 or 308 shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture. Id. § 2609(a). In
establishing theft, the burden of proof is on the United States. Id. § 2610. Subsections
311 (1) and (2) require the United States to establish that the archaeological materials have
been properly listed and that stolen cultural property is documented as the inventory of a
museum or similar institution, and was stolen after the CPIA became law. Id. § 2610(1)-
(2)(A),(B). "The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. 97-446,
became effective on April 12, 1983, and the provisions relating to the importation of stolen
property became effective on that date." Inapplicability of Notice and Delayed Effective
Date Provisions, 50 Fed, Reg. 26194 (1985).
80. "In the customs territory of the United States, and in the Virgin Islands, the provi-
sions of this title shall be enforced by appropriate customs officers." 19 U.S.C. § 2613
(1982).
81. NSPA, supra note 7.
82. Id. § 2314.
83. For a discussion of the legislative history of the NSPA, see United States v. Smith,
686 F.2d 234, 244-46 (5th Cir. 1982). The Smith court noted that the NSPA was an
attempt to aid the states by providing a centralized, i.e., federal, means of law enforcement.
Id.
84. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 1000-01; McClain II, 593 F.2d 658, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1979). See also hfra
notes 91-121 and accompanying text.
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d. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act
A recent U.S. statute protects archaeological materials on U.S.
and Indian lands. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act
(ARPA) of 197986 establishes penalties for knowing removal without a
permit of any archaeological resources located on these lands.8
7
ARPA levies criminal penalties similar to those of the NSPA. ss
3. Municipal Remedies
In addition to international measures and national statutes, civil
suits under state law (in state or federal courts) may accomplish the
recovery of stolen property. In these actions the plaintiff must prove
ownership; if goods are stolen, the original owner will prevail. Tradi-
tional property laws apply, involving concepts of title, bona fide pur-
chasers for value, and conversion.89 Civil action, however, is at best
slow, ponderous, and expensive. 90
86. ARPA, supra note 25.
87. See Id. § 470ee.
88. Under ARPA, any person who knowingly commits one of the prohibited acts,
upon conviction, could be fined from $10,000 to $100,000 or imprisoned for five years or
both, depending on the value of the materials and number of offenses. Id. § 470ee(d).
Under the NSPA, persons convicted of the prohibited activities could be fined $10,000 to
$100,000 or imprisoned up to ten years or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
89. See Nowell, American Tools to Control the Illegal Movement of Foreign Origin
Archaeological Materials: Criminal and Civil Approaches, 6 SYRACUSE. J. INT'L L. & COM.
77, 102-05 (1978). Legal title is "[o]ne cognizable or enforceable in a court of law, or once
which is complete and perfect so far as regards the apparent right of ownership and posses-
sion .... full and absolute title or apparent right of ownership .. " BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 807 (5th ed. 1979); a bona fide purchaser for value is "one who has purchased
property for value without any notice of any defects in the title of the seller." Id. at 161.
Conversion is "[a]n unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over
goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the
exclusion of the owner's rights." Id. at 300.
In a civil suit, where possession is disputed, as when an importer will not recognize the
claim of a private institutional, or government owner, interpleader actions may be under-
taken to decide the conflicting claims. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines interpleader as
follows:
When two or more persons claim the same thing (or find) of a third, and he, laying
no claim to it himself, is ignorant which of them has a right to it, and fears he may
be prejudiced by their proceedings against him to recover it, he may join such
claimants as defendants and require them to interplead their claims so that he may
not be exposed to double or multiple liability. A defendant exposed to similar
liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counter-claim.
Interpleader in federal court is governed by the Federal Interpleader Act, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1335, and Fed.R. Civil P. 22. Similar statutes and court rules govern
interpleader in state courts.
Id. at 733. See also U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, SUPPLEMENT TO POLICIES & PROCEDURES
MANUAL: SEIZURE AND DETENTION OF PRE-COLUMBIAN ARTIFACTS (Oct. 5, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Customs Service Manual].
90. Nowell, supra note 89, at 105. The claimant must prove ownership, which may
require specific identification of the objects and their source. Statutes of limitations may
preclude recovery even where ownership has been established. Id.
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II. NSPA AND CPIA: BASES OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. THE NSPA AND THE MCCLAIN DECISION
1. The McClain Decision
In United States v. McClain,91 the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas convicted five defendants of conspiring to
transport, receive, and sell stolen pre-Columbian artifacts of Mexican
origin in interstate commerce in violation of the NSPA.92 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit held that the NSPA properly applies to illegal expor-
tation of artifacts which Mexican law has declared to be the property
of the nation.
93
Critics of McClain assert that the court's application of the
NSPA lacks a valid legal basis.94 They emphasize that under
McClain, "property can be deemed 'stolen' under the NSPA simply
because a foreign country has passed a law declaring that it owns all
art objects found within its borders, notwithstanding the fact that citi-
zens of that foreign country may possess and trade in those objects."
9 5
They believe that McClain accepts "blanket declarations" of state
ownership without qualification and that the NSPA consequently
turns on the meaning of foreign law.96 The critics charge that the
McClain court's definitions of "stolen" and "ownership," under which
governments can suffer theft of property they own but do not possess,
are inconsistent with U.S. common law.
97
91. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 [McClain I, reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th
Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) [McClain I1], cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979).
92. The defendants had negotiated the sale of these objects with an undercover F.B.I.
agent; they knew export was illegal and violated Mexican ownership law. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the convictions because an inaccurate instruction
could have prejudiced the jury as to the defendant's knowledge of Mexico's ownership.
McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1000.
93. Id. at 996, 1002-03 & n.33. On a second appeal, another Fifth Circuit panel found
that the defendants clearly knew the goods belonged to the Mexican government and con-
victed the defendants of conspiracy to violate the NSPA. McClain II, 593 F.2d at 671-72.
McClain 11 affirmed the McClain I holding that the NSPA applies to property illegally
exported from a country that had assumed ownership of that property by legislative decla-
ration, and more fully explained the basis and requirements for government ownership. Id.
at 663-64, 670-71.
94. 128 CONG. REC. H10747 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982); 131 CONG. REc. S2611-12
(daily ed. Mar. 6, 1985); McAlee, supra note 9, at 836.
95. Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 863.
96. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 at 25 (statement of Paul Bator); McAlee, supra
note 9, at 827 (quoting Bator, supra note 1, at 328, 372-73); Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at
870.
97. 128 CONG. REC. H10747 (daily ed. Dec 21, 1982); 131 CONG. REC. S2612 (daily
ed. Mar. 6, 1985) (statement of Sen. Moynihan); Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 863 n.23;
Bator, supra note 1, at 348 & n.129 (quoting amicus brief filed by Arnold & Porter on
behalf of The American Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art).
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The critics also argue that McClain's interpretation of the NSPA
is inconsistent with the CPIA and the aims of the UNESCO Conven-
tion. They claim that, in unilaterally responding to the ownership dec-
larations of foreign countries, the NSPA rejects the basic principle of
CPIA, which is that U.S. measures to control pillage will be part of a
concerted international effort.98 The commentators criticize U.S. Cus-
toms Service enforcement of the NSPA and the bilateral agreements as
inconsistent with the principle of participation in a truly international
effort. They accuse the Customs Service of exceeding its statutory
authority. 99
B. THE MCCLAIN REQUIREMENTS, LEGAL FOUNDATION, AND
CONSISTENCY WITH U.S. LAW
1. Requirements
The McClain court held that property stolen from a foreign gov-
ernment, like property stolen from a private owner, is within the pro-
tection of the NSPA. °° But contrary to the views of McClain's
critics,10 1 blanket declarations do not meet the standards for govern-
ment ownership under McClain. For legitimate ownership, the
McClain court required clear and unambiguous laws and insisted that
the NSPA "cannot properly be applied to items deemed stolen only on
the basis of unclear pronouncements by a foreign legislature."'' 02 A
broad claim of national patrimony will not constitute a valid owner-
ship law. 103
The critics mistakenly believe that under McClain, the NSPA
equates illegal export with theft, and use this as a major argument
against the McClain holding.104 Under McClain, however, theft
98. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 (testimony of Sen. Moynihan, Douglas Ewing);
McAlee, supra note 9, at 814, 836; Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 860-63.
99. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 at 6, 102 (testimony of Sen. Moynihan, Douglas
Ewing); McAlee, supra note 9, at 815, 829, 836; Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 869-74, 878-
94.
100. McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 994-97 (5th Cir. 1977). "In addition to the rights of
ownership as understood by the common law, the N.S.P.A. also protects ownership derived
from foreign legislative pronouncements, even though the owned objects have never been
reduced to possession by the foreign government .... McClain 11, 593 F.2d 658, 664 (5th
Cir. 1977).
101. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 1, at 350: "A blanket legislative declaration of state
ownership of all antiquities, discovered and undiscovered, without more, is an abstrac-
tion.... Yet McClain gives this abstraction dramatic weight: illegal export, after the adop-
tion of the declaration, suddenly becomes 'theft'."
102. McClain II, 593 F.2d at 671. This mandate requires at the threshold "sufficient
clarity to survive translation into terms understandable by and binding upon American
citizens." Id. at 670. See also McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1000.
103. McClain I1, 593 F.2d at 671.
104. "The key question remains whether excavations unauthorized by a foreign govern-
ment constitute a 'theft' under the National Stolen Property Act. This is the controversial
issue at the heart of the McClain decision." Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 867.
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remains distinct from illegal export. Export restrictions must accom-
pany a nation's valid declaration of ownership, but the violation of
export controls in the absence of such a declaration does not constitute
theft.10 5 On this point the McClain court was explicit:
the state's power to regulate is not ownership .... [restrictions on exportation]
do not create "ownership" in the state. The state comes to own property only
when it acquires such property in the general manner by which private persons
come to own property, or when it declares itself the owner; the declaration is
an attribute of sovereignty.
10 6
Critics of the McClain holding would withhold recognition of this
sovereignty, fearing that a foreign country can invoke the criminal leg-
islation of the United States "by simply waving a magic wand and
promulgating [a] metaphysical declaration of ownership." 10 7 The
point, however, is not whether U.S. sanctions under the NSPA will
assist the exporting country enforce its export rules, but whether U.S.
law applies. In regulating goods that cross its border from a foreign
country and defining the conditions under which it will recognize for-
eign laws, the United States is applying its own law. Moreover, the
McClain construction of the NSPA is faithful to congressional intent
to protect the owners of stolen property, whoever they are.'08
Furthermore, the NSPA mandates the stringent requirement of
knowledge (scienter) for criminal liability. The defendant must know
that a country has an ownership law and export restrictions before he
is deemed to have stolen property from that country. 109 It is difficult
to prove scienter. The government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew the goods were stolen.110 The McClain
105. "We do not base this conclusion on illegal export of antiquities." McClain I, 545
F.2d at 996.
106. Id. at 1002-03.
107. Bator, supra note 1, at 350-51.
108. For a general summary of the legislative history and congressional intent behind
the NSPA, see United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 244-46 (5th Cir. 1982). "The aim of
the statute is, of course, to prohibit the use of interstate transportation facilities for goods
having certain unlawful qualities. This reflects a congressional purpose to reach all ways by
by which an owner is wrongfully deprived of the use of benefits of the use of his property."
Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1960). As the McClain court recog-
nized, "The Republic of Mexico, when stolen property has moved across the Mexican bor-
der, is in a similar position to any state of the United States in which a theft occurs and the
property is moved across state boundaries." McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 994. Thus, the use of
the NSPA to regulate foreign commerce is just as much an application of U.S. law as its
use to regulate interstate commerce.
109. McClain I, 545 F.2d at 992; McClain II, 593 F.2d at 672; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315.
110. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 27 (testimony of James I.K. Knapp). Mr.
Knapp provided an Appendix on the applicability of the NSPA to certain forms of stolen
archaeological and ethnological material to emphasize the prosecution's heavy burden of
proof. The Appendix stated that "[t]he Government would have to show actual knowl-
edge. The uncertainty of foreign laws and honest claims of an innocent purchase for value
without guilty knowledge would be extremely hard to overcome." Id. See also Nowell,
supra note 89, at 99; Note, supra note 34, at 940; Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 883. Fitzpat-
rick, a McClain critic, notes that the McClain decisions emphasized the specific, personal-
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court emphasized that any doubt about scienter should be resolved in
favor of lenity.III Like the requirements of clarity and unambiguity in
foreign declarations of ownership, the scienter requirement functions
both as a limit on practical enforcement and a safeguard that the
NSPA will not be applied illegitimately.
2. Legal Foundation
The charge that McClain lacks legal foundation rests on the belief
that the McClain court's definitions of "stolen" and "ownership," and
its denotation of governments as owners are inconsistent with U.S.
common law.112 Under this view of the common law, "stealing"
requires theft from an owner; ownership requires possession. Since
governments claim ownership without actual possession of artifacts,
they cannot be owners.
In fact, the McClain court's definitions have strong legal support
both in U.S. law and in the legal doctrines of many nations. In defin-
ing "stolen," the McClain court relied on a Supreme Court holding in
United States v. Turley, which interpreted "stolen" broadly. 13 The
Turley court cited an earlier Fifth Circuit NSPA case, Crabb v. Zerbst,
which recognized that "stealing [has] no common law meaning to
restrict its meaning as an offense, [and] is commonly used to denote
any dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains that which
rightfully belongs to another . -".114 McClain also relied on a post-
Turley Fifth Circuit case, Lyda v. United States, which, in construing
the NSPA, endorsed the broad Turley reading of "stolen." 115 The
McClain court, quoting the Lyda decision, stated that "[the NSPA]
reflects a congressional purpose to reach all ways by which an owner is
wrongfully deprived of the use or benefit of the use of his property
(emphasis added)."'"16
McClain's reading of "stolen" is thus consistent with U.S. prece-
dent. Furthermore, to the degree that the series of broad readings cre-
ized scienter requirement of the NSPA and the need for a jury to find that the defendant
knew the exportation of Pre-Columbian artifacts violated a clear legislative declaration of a
Latin American country. Id. at 883-84. Mr. Knapp also stated that "[e]ach of the various
elements listed below [for criminal conviction under the NSPA] must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9.
111. McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 995.
112. See e.g., ARPA, supra note 25.
113. 352 U.S. 407 (1957). Turley concerned the interstate transportation of stolen vehi.
eles. The court stated that because "stolen" has no accepted common law meaning, the
word should be interpreted broadly, consistent with the purpose of the legislation in which
it appears. Id. at 411-12.
114. Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1938) (cited with approval in Turley,
352 U.S. at 412 n.9).
115. Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1960).
116. McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 995 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977).
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ate a common law usage of "stolen," McClain follows the evolving
common law. But whether regarded simply as adopting its prece-
dents, or as a marker on the road of developing common law, McClain
does not lack legal foundation; it applies accepted principles and defi-
nitions of "stealing" and "ownership" to property which a country
may own.
The history of "stolen" after McClain upholds the court's con-
struction. In United States v. Smith,1 17 the Fifth Circuit, excepting a
copyright violation from the broad reach of "stealing" under the
NSPA, cited a 1978 Second Circuit case 1 8 to emphasize that stealing
is essentially an offense against another's proprietary or possessory
interests in property. 1 9 Finally, in United States v. Gallant, a district
court cited Smith to emphasize that "the statutory language 'stolen'
and 'converted' covers a broad range of illegal acquisition and use of
another's property," and that the phraseology used by Congress, "sto-
len, converted, or taken by fraud," is intended "to cover illegal acqui-
sitions and uses comprehensively."
120
3. Ownership and U.S. Law
The McClain court asserted that "possession is but a frequent
incident, not the sine qua non of ownership, in the common law or the
civil law."121 The McClain court correctly stated U.S. law, under
which a state or national government may be an owner even though it
has never physically possessed the goods it owns.
A state may own property or resources. For example, Louisiana
has declared that it owns wild birds, quadrupeds, fish, aquatic life,
oysters, shellfish, and the beds of bodies of water within the state,
although these 'objects' have not been reduced to state possession.
1 22
Recent decisions involving NSPA violations have upheld state owner-
ship of alligators.1 23 In Geer v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court
117. United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1982).
118. United States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1978).
119. 686 F.2d at 243.
120. United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
121. McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1977).
122. 56 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 (West 1985). See also Replies of U.S. Dep't of State
to Questions from the Subcomm. on Criminal Law, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (testi-
mony of Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal Adviser, Educational, Cultural and Public Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State), June 24, 1985 [hereinafter cited as Replies]. The U.S. Department of
Justice concurred in these Replies.
123. United States v. Plott, 345 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v.
Klapisch, No. 77-620, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 1978) (unreported decision). Judge
Sifton held that the Louisiana declaration of ownership of alligators suffices "to establish
that the skins of wild alligators may be shown to have been 'stolen' within the meaning" of
the NSPA. Id.
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affirmed that a state owns wildlife in its sovereign capacity. 124 In
United States v. Long Cove Seafood, the Second Circuit emphasized
that a state or a town may be an owner of clams or other natural
resources which are not possessed. 125
On a national level, the Archaelogical Resources Protection Act
(ARPA), which protects archaeological artifacts on public and Indian
lands, 126 supports the McClain definition of theft and contains paral-
lels in relief to the NSPA. 127 Although ARPA does not assert public
title to artifacts found on Indian lands, the statute's legislative history
makes clear that Congress regards such materials as having been sto-
len.128 The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs justified need
for the law by noting "the dramatic rise in recent years of illegal exca-
vations on public lands and Indian lands for private gain" and found
that existing penalties "have proven to be an inadequate deterrent to
theft of archaeological resources from public lands."' 129 Thus, like the
NSPA, ARPA covers stolen materials owned by individuals (Indians)
or by sovereign nations (Indian tribes, or the U.S. government). And
like the NSPA, ARPA provides criminal penalties for all who know-
ingly commit one of the prohibited acts.
C. LEGAL CONSISTENCY: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
Both common law and civil law systems in many countries reveal
concepts of national or state ownership that do not require possessory
interests by the government. The doctrine of Treasure Trove provides
salient illustration of this kind of government ownership. According
to this doctrine, the sovereign or government is entitled to treasure-
originally limited to gold and silver-which has been buried in the
ground over time and of which the ownership is unknown.' 30
The Treasure Trove doctrine runs through the legal systems of
many nations, spanning vast eras and far-flung locations. Numerous
examples of laws exist from early Christian times to the twentieth cen-
124. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). Plott court cited the Geer holding.
345 F. Supp. at 1232.
125. "We do not suggest that a larceny could not be proven here. If an owner gives
permission to a clam digger to take mature clams and expressly prohibits the taking of seed
clams, and if the digger exceeds this license and intentionally takes both mature and seed
clams, then the digger may be guilty of a larceny of the seed clams. It would be no less a
larceny if the owner were a town and the express prohibition were found in a town ordi-
nance." United States v. Long Cove Seafood 582 F.2d, 159, 165-66 (1978).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa.-ll. (1982). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
127. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa.-ll. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1982). See supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
128. H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-10 (1979).
129. Id. at 7.
130. Replies, supra note 122. See SIR GEORGE F. HILL, TREASURE TROVE IN LAW
AND PRACTICE FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PRESENT DAY (1980).
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tury which vested title in whole or part in the sovereign or govern-
ment, even though the treasure was not on public lands and had not
been reduced to possession. 31 In the United States, a treasure trove
law existed in New York before 1829, when it was repealed because
the State seldom exercised its title. 132 In addition, federal legislation is
now pending to vest title in the United States in any abandoned histor-
ical shipwreck located on the outer continental shelf.
133
Significantly, the doctrine of Treasure Trove has been extended
beyond its original scope to include jewelry, non-gold coins, and antiq-
uities.134 Thus, Treasure Trove laws are the natural predecessors of
recent national laws, such as those of many Latin American countries,
which claim archaeological treasures and antiquities for the govern-
ment without regard to ownership of the site or possession of the
objects.135 Also, in the Treasure Trove laws of several countries, the
131. HILL, supra note 130. In England, recent cases have applied the treasure trove
doctrine. See, e.g., Attorney-General for the Duchy of Lancaster v. G.E. Overton Farms
Ltd., 3 All E.R. 503 (1980), cited in Palmer, Treasure Trove and the Protection of Antiqui-
ties, 44 MOD. L. REV. 178 (1981). See also Krys, Treasure Trove Under Anglo-American
Law, 11 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. RaV. 214, 238 n.lA (1982) (describing 1979 discovery of
the Thetford treasure).
132. Hill, supra note 130, at 287 n.4. Recent cases in Florida, Texas, and North Caro-
lina have upheld sovereign ownership of abandoned shipwrecks in state territorial waters.
See State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert. denied 355 U.S.
881 (1956); Platoro, Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. Tex.
1973), rev'd on other grounds 508 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1975); Bruton v. Flying "W" Enterprises,
Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968), cited in Read, Open Season on Ancient Ship-
wrecks, 4 NOVA L.J. 213, 217 nn.17-18, 19 (1980).
133. H.R. 1195, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), cited in Read, supra note 132 at 233 & n.8.
See also Note, Property Rights in Recovered Sea Treasure: The Salvor's Perspective, 3 N.Y.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271, 303-04 & n.244. (1982).
134. HILL, supra note 130.
135. Replies, supra note 122; Ely Maurer, Assistant Legal Adviser, Educational, Cul-
tural, and Public Affairs, U. S. Dep't of State, testified that "perhaps two dozen [countries]
appear to have legislation which, at least for some categories of cultural property," might
approach the McClain standard sufficiently to raise the question of the NSPA's applicabil-
ity to their laws. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9. As governments request assistance in
recovering cultural property or Customs or the Justice Department investigates potential
violations of U.S. lav concerning archaeological artifacts of foreign origin, the U.S. State
Department reviews the legislation of individual countries. To date, the courts have found
the legislation of Mexico and Peru sufficient to sustain prosecution under the NSPA. See
McClain I, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th
Cir. 1974).
In the Hollinshead case, the U. S. Government prosecuted an art dealer who had
imported a famous monumental Guatemalan stela, the Machaquila, which had been stolen,
dismembered, and exported. Art experts were familiar with the work; it was registered as a
Guatemalan historical monument; the dealer knew it was stolen. No one suggested that
Guatemalan claims of ownership were invalid, or that the NSPA should not apply. In
McClain, the objects involved were not renowned but their provenance was traceable; there
was evidence that they had been stolen from Mexican pre-Columbian sites in violation of
Mexican law, and, as the McClain court ascertained through a careful survey of Mexican
law, the 1972 law gave valid ownership to Mexico. McClain was as clear an instance of
theft from a legitimate national owner as was Hollinshead. (A particularly interesting
aspect of McClain is that the defendants were also arranging to sell artifacts accumulated in
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taking by finders of the treasure is characterized as theft, embezzle-
ment, or stealing, and subject to criminal prosecution and civil
action. 136 Under English law, title is deemed to be vested in the
government while the Treasure Trove is still in the ground
Los Angeles by Clive Hollinshead, the Hollinshead defendant, with the items valued at
$850,000. See McClain II, 593 F.2d 658, 662-63 (5th Cir. 1979)). The McClain court
therefore did nothing new; it merely articulated guidelines for valid government ownership.
See Replies, supra note 122.
In negotiating bilateral agreements with Peru and Ecuador, the U.S. State Department
found that Peru, but not Ecuador, had legislation declaring national ownership of archaeo-
logical resources. Since this determination, however, Peru has repealed its statute by legis-
lation enacted December, 1984. General Law of Protection for the National Cultural
Patrimony, Peru, Law 24047 (Jan. 6, 1985). It is not clear whether this new Peruvian law
would meet the standards as recognized under U.S. law. Ecuador's law would not meet the
McClain standard, however, because although it refers generally to archaeological
resources as part of the national patrimony, it does not specifically declare these to be the
property of the nation.
Latin American countries that have declared national ownership of at least some catego-
ries of archaeological, cultural or palaentological resources include British Honduras
(Belize) (ownership of antiquities is vested in the Crown); Costa Rica, Law 7 (Oct., 1938)
(archaeological objects found in the soil and monuments that date prior to the Spanish
conquest and not privately held at the time of this law are the property of the state); Nica-
ragua, Decree 142, art. 1 (July 25, 1941) (archaeological, historical and artistic monuments
that are found in the territory of the Republic and not privately held at the time this Decree
is promulgated are property of the state) and Decree 142, art. 1 (1979) (archaeological and
palaentological deposits of archaeological interest constitute property of the state and
removal of such objects is prohibited); Panama Property Law, art. 82 (Sept. 1946)
(exploitation and commerce in archaeological monuments and objects by inexpert persons
and without authorization by the executive branch are prohibited); El Salvador, Law for
Protection of Archaeological, Anthropological and Palaentological Antiquities, art. 1
(1903) (such materials found in the territory of El Salvador are national property); Argen-
tina, Law 9030, art. 1 (archaeological and palaentological ruins and deposits of scientific
interest are declared to be the property of the nation) and art. 7 (the government can expro-
priate these materials in private hands for the enrichment of national museums); Brazil,
Law 3924, art. 7 (July 26, 1961) (archaeological or prehistoric deposits of any nature not
declared in a form specified shall be considered patrimonial goods of the union); Bolivia,
Law of 1906 (certain ruins, e.g., Tihuanacu, are the property of the nation); Chile, Law
17288, art. 21 (Jan. 27, 1970) (by the sole operation of the law, architectural monuments
are the property of the state as are anthropological sites, ruins, and deposits which exist
above or beneath the surface of the national territory. Pieces and sites where found are also
covered); Venezuela, art. 13 (Aug. 15, 1945) (the following are the property of the State: all
archaeological objects from the era prior to the Spanish conquest, and human or animal
fossils which may be found in any part of the subsoil of the country). Telephone interview
with Faye Armstrong, Attorney Advisor, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State
(Jan. 21, 1986) (The author is indebted to Ms. Armstrong for her research and translations
of the aforementioned laws).
The U.S. State Department also mentioned the many non-Latin American countries
which have national ownership laws, including Haiti, Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Turkey, Algeria, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Tunisia. Replies,
supra note 122. The validity of the laws of any of these countries for U.S. law would
require specific determination and, should NSPA prosecution occur, court decision. See
BURNHAM, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL
LEGISLATIONS (1974); UNESCO, PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY
(1984); see also, L. Prott & P.J. O'Keefe, National Legal Control of Illicit Traffic in Cul-
tural Property (1983); Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property,
19 THE INT'L LAW. 835 (1985).
136. Replies, supra note 122; HILL, supra note 130.
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undiscovered. 137
The nationalization of sub-soil mineral resources further exempli-
fies a concept of government ownership of objects without regard to
ownership of the land itself or to previous possession of those
objects.' 38  Governments which nationalize their subsoil mineral
resources own them whether discovered or not. 139 In such cases, if a
particular mineral resource, such as oil, is discovered on private land,
the oil belongs to the country. If the oil is imported into the U.S., its
title is unquestioned. 14°
Government ownership without actual possession is an interna-
tional reality in historical and contemporary practice. As seen in U.S.
national and state ownership of natural resources, in the Treasure
Trove laws that exist in many countries, and in the nationalization of
subsoil mineral riches, the broad prevalence of government ownership
supports judicial determination that such ownership validly can exist.
McClain's interpretation of the NSPA has a firm legal foundation in
U.S. law and is consistent with the doctrines of other nations regard-
ing government ownership of property without a possessory interest.
III. THE CONSISTENCY OF THE CPIA WITH U.S. LAW
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
A. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST CONSISTENCY
Critics of the McClain decision believe that the NSPA is a unilat-
eral response to the problem of pillage, and therefore violates the basic
principle of the CPIA that U.S. participation in control of the illicit
art trade should be part of a concerted international effort.141 In this
137. HILL, supra note 130.
138. Replies, supra note 122.
139. See A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Burma, art. 18 (1982); Cape Verde, art. 11 (1982); Chile, art. 24 (1980); Costa
Rica, art. 121, subsec. 14(b) (1982); Guatemala, art. 63 (1982)).
140. Replies, supra note 122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41, comment d, illustration 8 (1985).
141. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. It is not within the scope of this Note to
address a significant and related controversy, but its existence should be noted. Senator
Charles Mathias, Jr. has introduced a new bill, called the Cultural Property Repose Act,
that would limit the period in which foreign countries could sue museums and private art
collectors in the United States for the return of stolen art. The Senate Subcommittee on
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks held a Hearing on this bill on January 9, 1986. Sup-
porters of the bill include museums, art dealers, and private collectors, who believe that the
CPIA does not afford adequate protection against foreign lawsuits. Many archaeologists
and anthropologists, the U.S. State and Justice Departments, and some museums oppose
the bill. Opponents believe that the bill would make it easier for art dealers and collectors
to purchase and collect stolen goods and that the bill goes against the spirit of the CPIA,
under which civil suits may be pursued to resolve questions of ownership. The bill is not
scheduled for a vote. See Cultural Property Repose Act, Hearing on S. 1523 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (unpublished, untitled hearing). See also, Senators Weigh Limit
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view, not only are the McClain decision and U.S. Customs enforce-
ment of it under the NSPA inconsistent with congressional policy in
the CPIA, but other U.S. measures, namely the bilateral agreements
with several Latin American countries, also violate the premise of the
CPIA. 142 The critics accuse the U.S. Customs Service, whose role is
to apply all relevant U.S. laws to goods that cross the border, of over-
stepping its statutory authority and of blanket detention of pre-Colum-
bian art under the aegis of McClain.143
B. U.S. REGULATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY:
A PLURALISTIC APPROACH
The argument that the NSPA is a unilateral response that is
inconsistent with congressional policy in the CPIA misreads congres-
sional intent. U.S. policy on the regulation of cultural property has a
common goal. In seeking to deter the illicit trade in art, it relies on
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches. United States reme-
dies therefore include the NSPA, the Pre-Columbian Act of 1972,
ARPA, the bilateral agreements with Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, and
Ecuador, and the CPIA. These remedies attack aspects of the same
problem. Consistent in purpose and complementary in approach, they
differ only in procedures and scope. Such differences, however, are
not inconsistent.
to Claims on Stolen Art, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at C19, col. 1; 2 Senate Bills Focus on
Stolen Art, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, at C19, col. 1.
142. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9.
Because McClain interprets U.S. criminal laws so as to require the United States to
recognize foreign countries' bald assertions of national ownership, the State
Department has continued.., to ban from entry into this country cultural prop-
erty from the other country, if it claims national ownership-despite the clear
intent of the CPIA that such claims alone not determine our import policy. There
are currently three such agreements in effect .... Most disturbing, however, is an
agreement with Guatemala entered into within the last year. Two years after
enactment of the CPIA, the State Department has simply disregarded the stan-
dards, criteria and requirements of that Act.
Id. (testimony of Sen. Moynihan).
The law [CPIA] required multinational responses as the general rule .... Yet in
spite of this law, the State Department has continued to negotiate and execute
agreements that require only unilateral action. Why is this inconsistency an issue
here? Because these agreements are based only on McClain-type assertions of own-
ership, not on any of the standards set forth in the cultural property law.
Id. (testimony of Douglas Ewing).
In the author's view, these statements distort the intention and content of the bilateral
agreements and reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of their operation. It may be
noted that legal scholars, such as Paul Bator and James Fitzpatrick do not make such
claims. The testimony is reproduced here to illustrate the extreme and political nature of
the position asserted. In rebuttal, see Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 (testimony of Ely
Maurer).
143. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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1. U.S. Statutes
The NSPA, the Pre-Columbian Act, and ARPA are unilateral
statutory measures with common goals and important similarities.
The NSPA mandates criminal penalties and seeks to prevent the
knowing international and interstate transport, receipt, and sale of sto-
len goods above $5000 in value, whatever their nature. Although
ARPA applies only to archaeological materials on U.S. and Indian
lands, it closely resembles the NSPA in applying penal sanctions for
the knowing sale, transport, purchase, or receipt of these materials
illicitly obtained. Also, like the NSPA, ARPA protects both public
and private owners. The Pre-Columbian Act, a civil statute, repre-
sents a unilateral U.S. initiative to prohibit the importation of pre-
Columbian sculptures and murals without export certification by the
country of origin. 144 Like the NSPA, it observes the export rules of
the countries concerned; unlike the NSPA, it does not require that the
objects be stolen for its ban on importation to apply.
2. Bilateral Agreements
The bilateral agreements with Latin American countries repre-
sent yet another U.S. approach to the problems of theft and pillage.
Under these agreements, the United States officially stands ready to
help the countries concerned recover stolen property under existing
U.S. law. The United States actually represents the country in its
claim, employing available U.S. laws. If a dealer or other purchaser
contests the country's ownership, the United States will initiate suits
in federal court to determine who is the owner. 145 The bilateral agree-
ments, which rely on existing U.S. civil laws to supply the remedy for
the theft of cultural property, offer an avenue other than national stat-
utes and international conventions by which a country can recover its
stolen art.146 While a nation can always bring civil suit for recovery in
144. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1982). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
145. See Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 41 (testimony of Ely Maurer); see also
Replies, supra note 122.
146. For example, one such agreement provides:
1. Each Party shall inform the other of thefts of archaeological, historical, or
cultural properties of which it has knowledge when it has reason to believe that the
objects stolen are likely to be introduced into international trade. In doing so, it
shall furnish sufficient descriptive information to enable the other Party to identify
the objects. Upon receipt of such information, the other Party, through its cus-
toms organization or otherwise as appropriate and with the assistance of the
informing Party, shall take such actions as may be lawful and practicable to detect
the entry of such objects into its territory and to locate such objects within its
territory. If the other Party locates objects which appear to meet the description of
those reported stolen, it shall provide the informing Party with all available infor-
mation concerning their location and the steps which would have to be taken to
secure their return, assuming that it can be demonstrated that they have been
stolen.
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the absence of such an agreement, the agreements bind the parties to
aid in the return of stolen art and facilitate international exchange of
art between the countries. They do not require U.S. law enforcement
authorities to return objects to a foreign government on that govern-
ment's representation of its laws.1
47
3. The CPIA
The CPIA derives in part from other statutory approaches and
expressly relies on the coexistence of U.S. penal and civil laws.
According to its legislative history, the CPIA "reflects the approach to
illicit trade in art adopted by the Congress in the Pre-Columbian Art
Act of 1972. . . -148 This approach came from a growing awareness
among U.S. policy makers that the destruction and dispersal of irre-
placeable sites and artifacts through illicit taking was of grave concern
2. At the request of the other Party, each Party shall employ the legal means at
its disposal to recover and return from its territory stolen archaeological, historical
and cultural properties that have been removed from the territory of the requesting
Party.
3. Requests for the recovery and return of specific archaeological, historical and
cultural properties shall be made through diplomatic channels. The requesting
Party shall furnish expeditiously, at its expense, documentation and other evidence
necessary to establish its claim to such properties.
4. If the requested Party obtains the necessary legal authorization, it shall return
the requested archaeological, historical or cultural properties to the persons desig-
nated by the requesting Party. If, however, it fails to achieve such authorization, it
shall use its best efforts to protect the legal rights of the requesting Party and
facilitate its bringing a private action for return of the property.
5. The Parties, through the posting of signs, distribution of pamphlets or such
other means as either may select, shall endeavor fully to inform persons entering or
leaving their territories of laws of each of the Parties with respect to archaeologi-
cal, historical or cultural properties and of any specific procedures or requirements
established by the Parties in relation thereto.
Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural
Properties, supra note 32, at art. II.
147. See id. In testimony regarding the consistency of the U. S. bilateral agreements
with the CPIA, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Ely Maurer stated:
The central provision of each of these agreements obligates each party, at the
request of the other, to use the legal means at its disposal to recover and return
from its territory stolen archaeological, historical and cultural properties removed
from the territory of the requesting party.
Implementation of these agreements turns entirely on the operation of U.S. law.
They do not, as has been suggested, enable the Customs Service, or any other fed-
eral law enforcement authority, to seize objects and return them to a foreign gov-
ernment on that government's representation of its laws. Nor do they alter in any
way laws governing the importation of cultural property into the United States.
These agreements, in the Department's view, are neither affected by nor incon-
sistent with the CCPIA [sic], which ... does not purport to limit ordinary police
cooperation in the recovery of stolen property.
Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 5-6 (testimony of Ely Mauier).
148. S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1982). In 1977, Congress stated that the
CPIA bill "generally follows the patterns of a broader scale of the Pre-Columbian Art
Act." H.R. REP. No. 615, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
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not only to the countries being looted but to the United States as a
primary destination for the loot.1 49 Like the pre-Columbian statute
but covering a broader range of materials, the CPIA prohibits impor-
tation without requiring that the objects it protects be stolen. In its
focus on concerted international effort and its broad prohibition
against the theft of cultural property from museums, churches, or sim-
ilar institutions,150 the CPIA transcends the scope of the Pre-Colum-
bian Act. But the CPIA and its wholly unilateral predecessor share
the same principles and goals: to stop the destruction of archaeologi-
cal sites and the illegal importation and theft of unique historical
artifacts.
Congress has consistently maintained complementary approaches
to the control of pillage. The 1972 Senate understanding of the
UNESCO Convention's prohibition against importation of cultural
property stolen from foreign museums states that "Article 7(b) is with-
out prejudice to other remedies, civil or penal, available under the laws
of the states parties."1 51 The 1982 Senate report approving the Cul-
tural Property Bill specified that the CPIA follows the original 1972
Senate qualification to acceptance of the UNESCO Convention and
does not alter existing remedies:
The bill takes into account the reservation and understandings accompanying
the grant by the Senate in 1972 of its advice and consent .... Further, it
neither pre-empts State law in any way, nor modifies any Federal or State rem-
edies that may pertain to articles to which the provisions of this bill apply.1
52
In fact, the 1982 Senate report is even more explicit than the earlier
understanding; it specifies that the CPIA does not supersede the
NSPA:
Implementation of article 7(b) of the Convention affects neither existing reme-
dies available in State or Federal courts nor laws prohibiting the theft and the
knowing receipt and transportation of stolen property in interstate and foreign
commerce (e.g., National Stolen Property Act, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 2314-
15). . 153
4. The CPIA's Unilateral Provision
Arguments that the NSPA is a unilateral response that opposes
the multilateral requirement of the CPIA ignores the important uni-
lateral aspect of the CPIA.' 54 For although the CPIA embodies the
ideal of concerted international effort in its provision for multilateral
controls, it also permits the United States to act unilaterally in an
149. S. REP. No. 564, supra note 148, at 23; H.R. REP. No. 615, supra note 148, at 4.
150. See supra notes 57-80 and accompanying text.
151. S. EXEc. REP. No. 29, supra note 35, at 4.
152. S. REP. No. 564, supra note 148, at 22.
153. Id. at 33.
154. 19 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982). See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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emergency, and for a period of eight years. For such action, the Presi-
dent must determine that an emergency exists according to stringent
criteria. The material must be newly discovered, from a site of high
cultural significance, and the jeopardy from pillage must be of crisis
proportions. The only other limitations on unilateral emergency
action are that the state party must request assistance and the Presi-
dent must consider the views of his Advisory Committee on the merits
of such action. 155 Some commentators believe that the unilateral pro-
vision will prove to be the only effective mechanism of the CPIA.
156
This prediction awaits the event, but the presence and importance of
the CPIA's unilateral provision do not support a belief that the NSPA
clashes with the CPIA.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. LAW
1. Criticisms of Customs Enforcement
Critics view the U.S. Customs Service's detention of pre-Colum-
bian art that may be subject to NSPA prosecution as a new policy,
under which Customs enforces all foreign export controls and owner-
ship laws.1 57 They believe that the U.S. Customs Service is exceeding
its statutory authority, that its actions are inconsistent with Congres-
sional and U.S. policy as declared in the CPIA, and that Customs
enforcement has created a virtual embargo on Pre-Columbian art.
58
The critics claim that Customs prevents importation on the basis of
other countries' export prohibitions and broadly enforces foreign own-
ership claims under administrative regulations that rely only on the
"questionable" McClain interpretation of the NSPA.159 They further
charge that Customs abuses its discretion by detaining goods that may
be subject to NSPA prosecution even if the Service is not sure that
scienter can be proven.' 60 The critics also object to the policy under
which Customs returns improperly declared pre-Columbian art to
Mexico and Peru, and notifies other Latin American countries with
ownership laws of potential claims.' 61 They insist that zealous Cus-
155. 19 U.S.C. § 303(c)(3).
156. See Bator, Memorandum on H.R. 5643, printed in Hearing on H.R. 5643 and S.
2261 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 191-98 (1978). Bator supported the unilateral provision, noting that "[i]n
fact such a concerted international effort is extremely unlikely to take place. Id.
Appendix A, at 197.
157. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
158. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 at 6, 102 (testimony of Sen. Moynihan, Douglas
Ewing). See Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 858, 864-65, 869, 871, 892; McAlee, supra note 9,
at 829, 836-37.
159. Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 886.
160. Id. at 874-75.
161. McAlee, supra note 9, at 834-38.
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toms enforcement gives priority to bilateral agreements despite the
CPIA's mandate for multinational control measures, and illegiti-
mately offers aid to countries with which the United States has no
formal agreement.
162
Critics allege that Customs enforcement violates Congressional
and U.S. policy because it constitutes unilateral action and is therefore
inconsistent with the multilateral approach of the CPIA and the
UNESCO Convention. 163 Furthermore, in honoring Latin American
ownership claims, the Customs Service is said to revive the "blank
check" approach, of sweeping enforcement of other nations' export
controls, which the United States rejected in the UNESCO Conven-
tion and the CPIA. 164 Finally, the critics claim, Customs "new pol-
icy" violates the compromise which allowed the CPIA to become
law-an agreement that the non-dealer interests would support or not
oppose legislative repeal of the McClain decision.1
65
2. U.S. Customs Enforcement
These attacks on the U.S. Customs Service mischaracterize both
the basis on which Customs proceeds and what the Service actually
does. U.S. laws properly describe what goods may be imported, and
the Customs Service merely enforces U.S. laws.' 66 These laws include
162. See Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 at 6, 102 (testimony of Sen. Moynihan, Doug-
las Ewing).
163. Id. See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 858, 871; McAlee, supra note 9, at 815,
836-37.
164. McAlee, supra note 9, at 815, 836-37.
165. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9 at 6, 102 (testimony of Sen. Moynihan, Douglas
Ewing); Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 862-64; McAlee, supra note 9, at 827 n.60.
166. See Customs Requirements Relating to the Importation of Pre-Columbian Art and
Artifacts [on file at Cornell International Law Journal]. The U.S. Customs Service
enforces general and specific statutes, treaties, and agreements that cover cultural property.
The Customs Service also enforces the NSPA.
I. General Requirements. General requirements apply to all merchandise, including art.
They constitute three categories:
A. Declaration and Entry Requirements:
19 U.S.C. §§ 149, 1481,1484, 1485 (1982).
B. Examination and Customs Inspection:
19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1496, 1499, 1582 (1982).
C. Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures:
19 U.S.C. §§ 542, 545, 1497, 1592 (1982).
II. Specific Requirements.
A. Pre-Columbian Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1982), 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.105-12.109
(1985).
B. See Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2601-2613 (1982).
C. International Obligations.
1. U.S.-Mexico Agreement, see supra note 30.
2. U.S.-Peru Agreement, see supra note 31.
3. U.S.-Guatemala Agreement, see supra note 32.
III. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1982). See also Hearing on
S. 605, supra note 9. "The United States Customs Service is responsible at the border
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general statutes such as the NSPA and a U.S. Customs law that makes
it a felony to import any merchandise contrary to U.S. law. 167 Under
statutory authority, Customs may detain and appraise objects that
may be stolen to ascertain their character and origin. 168 Customs is
also responsible for enforcing specific laws pertaining to cultural prop-
erty; 169 in addition, Customs is the agency that refers cases for U.S.
action under bilateral agreements.
170
The Customs Service thus enforces a variety of U.S. laws that
seek to prevent the illegal importation of goods. To this end, Customs
has established stringent administrative guidelines set forth in a 1982
Manual Supplement to direct and restrain its officers in properly
enforcing U.S. laws. 171 And because pre-Columbian art is the subject
of a U.S. statute and of bilateral agreements, Customs appropriately
alerts its agents to the potential presence of pre-Columbian art at the
border. 1
72
The Customs Service does not enforce other countries' export
laws. According to the Service's administrative guidelines, "[ijf the
foreign country involved does not claim ownership but only controls
exports, no action should be taken unless U.S. Customs laws are vio-
lated."' 173 Customs does detain pre-Columbian objects that fall within
the Pre-Columbian Statute, objects improperly declared, and pre-
Columbian objects of Mexican or Peruvian origin. 174 Under the bilat-
eral agreements, the Service returns improperly declared objects from
for enforcing many laws and regulations on its own behalf and on behalf of over 40
other Federal agencies." Id. (testimony of Richard H. Abbey, Chief Counsel, U.S.
Customs Service).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1982). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1982) (authorizing penalties for
failure to declare articles upon entry into the United States); 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1982)
(authorizing Customs agents to search and seize property imported contrary to U.S. laws).
168. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1982). See CPIA, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1613 (1982).
169. The Service enforces the Pre-Columbian Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1982).
Since April 1983, it is also responsible for enforcing the CPIA's provision against theft of
cultural property from foreign museums or similar institutions. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613
(1982). See 19 C.F.R. § 12 (1985).
170. Minutes of First Meeting, Cultural Property Advisory Committee at 63-64 (testi-
mony of Stuart Seidel, Assistant Chief Counsel, Enforcement and Operations, U.S. Cus-
toms Service) (Mar. 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Minutes].
171. Customs Service Manual, supra note 89.
172. The Manual states that "[c]ustoms Officers should be alert to the importation of
any art or artifacts from a Central or South American culture which appears to be from the
Pre-Columbian era." Id. at 3. This art may be stelae or monumental sculpture prohibited
under the Pre-Columbian Act; it may be movable objects stolen from a country with which
the United States has a bilateral agreement to help the national owner recover its property;
it may be art stolen from a museum and prohibited entry by the CPIA; it may fall under
NSPA ban as goods knowingly stolen from an individual or national owner.
173. Id. at 3(e); see also Minutes, supra note 170, at 60. It should be noted, however,
that both the Pre-Columbian Act and the CPIA require that the countries whose archaeo-
logical goods they ban maintain export controls. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602, 2092(a) (1982).
174. Customs Service Manual, supra note 89, at 3(a)-3(c).
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Mexico and Peru upon request, unless the importer challenges owner-
ship.175 If goods come from Mexico or Peru and are properly
declared, those countries may still claim ownership to secure return of
the goods. If the importer contests national ownership, the U.S.
Attorney General may institute a suit for interpleader to resolve the
ownership question. 176 If goods come from another country with
ownership laws, the Customs Service notifies the country so that it
may lay claim if it wishes.177 Again, when a country claims owner-
ship and the importer disagrees, U.S. courts decide which claimant is
the valid owner. 178 The Customs Service uses a country's ownership
law as basis for a claim, not as proven ownership.
179
The Customs Service also impounds objects if there are grounds
for NSPA prosecution.1 80 Under McClain, the NSPA clearly applies
to cultural property stolen from a foreign country,18' and McClain
remains a sound basis for enforcement unless overruled or repealed.
175. Id. at 3(a).
176. Id. at 3(d).
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Minutes, supra note 170, at 66. "If they wish to claim ownership, we
will go to the interpleader action unless the importer wants to give up his right. If they
don't wish to claim ownership, we'll release it." Id. (testimony of Stuart Seidel).
179. Minutes, supra note 170, at 66.
Now why do we notify the people that we think own it? And here's where I think
a lot of the people in the art community misunderstand what Customs does. If we
find any object that we believe is stolen, we will contact the individual whom we
believe it was stolen from. You bring a motorcycle into the United States and
there is a report.., that this particular motorcycle was stolen, we will detain it and
notify the owner. If he claims it, even if the person who brought it in is totally
innocent, we will allow them to bring a suit in the nature of an interpleader. We
have conflicting claims of ownership, and if it was in fact stolen, somebody is enti-
tled to regain possession of that property. And since we have it we don't know
who to give it back to: the importer or the person from whom it was taken. And it
may have gone through many intermediary steps before it ever comes into the
United States. We find ourselves in a bad position. If we give it back to the
importer the legitimate owner has a claim against us, or may have a claim against
us. We have property which we believe was his that we released. If we give it back
to the foreign country, we have a claim by the importer, because the foreign coun-
try has not necessarily established valid title. So we don't get involved, we let the
U.S. District Court decide who the owner is, which I think is the fair way of doing
it, and the Commissioner of Customs believes it's the correct way of doing it....
Id.
180. See Customs Requirements Relating to the Importation of Pre-Columbian Art
and Artifacts, supra note 166. "If the importer acknowledges that he/she is aware of the
foreign law or there is other evidence of such knowledge, consideration should be given to
criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2314 in accordance with U.S. v. McClain ....
The articles may be seized as evidence of a crime." Customs Service Manual, supra note
89, at 3(b). See also Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 57 (testimony of Richard H. Abbey,
stating that the Customs Service is responsible for discovering violations of the NSPA in
connection with importations of art and rare archaeological and ethnological articles).
181. We hold that a declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal
exportation of an article can be considered theft, and the exported article consid-
ered 'stolen,' within the meaning of the National Property Act. Such a declaration
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In compliance with its administrative guidelines, Customs identifies
possible NSPA cases and refers them to the Justice Department for
decision. 182 Customs refers cases only if the importer admits knowing
that a country has an ownership law and export restrictions on the
object or if other evidence suggests the object has knowingly been sto-
len from such a country. 18 3 Customs detains the goods as evidence. 84
The critics deny Custom's authority to detain such items when officials
are unsure scienter can be proven, 185 but Customs responds that deten-
tion is only temporary until the Justice Department can determine if
the evidence warrants criminal prosecution. 18 6
The Customs Service does not violate Congressional intention as
expressed in the CPIA by enforcing of the NSPA. Congress emphati-
cally stated that the NSPA and CPIA were meant to coexist. 87 Nor
does Customs enforce "the broadest declarations of ownership" by
foreign sovereigns; where the United States considers that a country's
specific ownership law may be valid, it is for the courts to decide if
that law meets McClain's rigorous standard. 188 The Manual Supple-
ment takes an active view of Customs enforcement of U.S. statutes and
bilateral agreements. Whether this creates a "virtual embargo" on
combined with a restriction on exportation without consent of the owner (Mexico)
is sufficient to bring the NSPA into play.
McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1977).
182. See Minutes, supra note 170, at 64-65.
183. See Customs Service Manual, supra note 89, at 3(b).
184. Id.
Although the National Stolen Property Act makes it a crime for any person to
knowingly possess stolen art work over $5,000, criminal prosecution may not be
possible in all cases because of the inability to establish that the importer knew of
the foreign country's legislation. Nonetheless, if the item can be shown to be sub-
ject to the ownership claim, it shall be detained regardless of whether the individ-
ual is prosecuted or not.
Id.
185. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 875.
186. See Minutes, supra note 170, at 64-65.
Let's assume that an individual comes into the United States and declares an item
properly for U.S. Customs purposes. He tells us that it is an artifact. He tells us
that it is from Peru. He tells us how much he paid and that is the truthful amount
that he paid. Has he violated any law? And the answer is, he's probably violated
the National Stolen Property Act, if he knew that it was illegal to take it out of
Peru. So our instructions cover that situation, if the individual who brings it in
tells us-"Oh yes, I know it's illegal to take it out of Peru but who cares, I'm in the
United States now"--knowledge of the foreign law, interstate or foreign com-
merce, item over $5,000, we will seize the item as evidence of a violation of the
National Stolen Property Act, and we will refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney for
whatever prosecution he may deem appropriate. If he doesn't deem any appropri-
ate, that ends the matter from criminal prosecution. If the individual insists that
the item was lawfully acquired and that he has good title, there is a provision under
U.S. law for interpleader action....
Id. (testimony of Stuart Seidel).
187. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
188. See Minutes, supra note 170, at 66 (testimony of Stuart Seidel).
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pre-Columbian art depends upon one's values and perspective. 189 If
enforcement is effective, less pre-Columbian art will enter the United
States illegally, legal importers will experience delays, and some goods
imported by bona fide purchasers may be subject to return to a coun-
try with valid ownership laws. Such enforcement advances the preser-
vation of national patrimony and U.S. relations with Latin American
countries. This policy inevitably collides with the desires of dealers
and some museum officials for an unrestricted international art mar-
ket. The tension between these values, however, does not validate the
critics' charges that Customs acts ultra vires. To those opposed, the
law is onerous; nevertheless, the Customs Service acts within the
law. 190 Finally, legislative history does not support claims of a "deal"
to pass the CPIA in exchange for subsequent legislative repeal of
McClain.191
The U.S. Customs Service enforces all U.S. measures that control
the importation of illicit and stolen cultural property, including the
NSPA and the CPIA. It implements the same policy objectives that
produced the CPIA and caused Congress to employ complementary
measures to address the illicit art trade problem. Customs has not
embarked on a new policy in preserving cultural property but rather
continues to implement historic U.S. goals. Records of state property
returned by Customs to a foreign country exist as early as 1824.192 In
a 1982 letter, the Acting Commissioner of Customs explained that it
has "always been the policy of the United States to assist foreign coun-
tries in recovering stolen property, particularly art objects," 193 and
that the Customs Service has worked with the State Department and
189. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 9, at 864, 869-71; McAlee, supra note 9, at 818-20;
Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 6, 102 (testimony of Sen. Moynihan, Douglas Ewing).
190. See supra notes 157-88 and accompanying text.
191. The U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Justice, and USIA officially
went on record as not having participated in a "deal" to overturn McClain. Hearing on S.
605, supra note 9. In 1982, Edward Ing, Senator Matsunaga's chief aide, acting at Senator
Matsunaga's request, reached an understanding with a representative of Senator Moynihan
that in return for Senator Moynihan's agreement not to block the CPIA, Senator Dole
(with Senators Matsunaga and Moynihan) would introduce a bill to repeal McClain. Mr.
Ing stressed that he acted only on behalf of his principal, Senator Matsunaga, who wished
to help end the long deadlock between dealers and the other constituencies and facilitate
passage of the CPIA. Mr. Ing described a series of meetings with representatives of public
and private interests. Only the principals, i.e., Senator Moynihan and Senator Matsunaga
(with Senator Dole's cooperation), agreed that Senator Dole would introduce the bill to
repeal McClain. This agreement involved no further commitment and did not bind the
representatives of government and the academic and museum communities. Mr. Ing
received no commitment from officials in the State Department, the Department of Justice,
or the U.S. Customs Service, to support the bill. Telephone interview with Edward Ing
(Mar. 4, 1985).
192. See Minutes, supra note 170, at 66 (testimony of Stuart Seidel).
193. Letter from Alfred R. DeAngelus, Acting Commissioner of Customs, to Senator
Moynihan (June 10, 1982). Among the countries which the United States has helped to
recover foreign art are India, Italy, Germany, and several Latin American countries. Id.
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other agencies in this endeavor.' 94
IV. MCCLAIN, THE CPIA, AND THE CONSISTENCY OF
AMERICAN POLICY: A SUMMARY
A. THE VALUE OF MCCLAIN
1. A Sound Legal Basis
The stringent requirement of scienter and the difficulties of proof
are likely to limit the McClain application of the NSPA to those clear
and egregious cases which even critics agree justify NSPA prosecu-
tion. 195 Post-McClain history does not support fears that McClain
will lead to indiscriminate enforcement. Indeed, there have been only
two NSPA prosecutions involving cultural property.196 Dealers' fears
that the NSPA may subject them to criminal prosecution for trading
in illicit art are exaggerated.197
But although the NSPA under McClain is unlikely to result in
significant penal enforcement, McClain provides a sound legal basis
for pluralistic and complementary U.S. efforts to address the continu-
ing problem of pillage. McClain's criteria for establishing foreign
ownership supply a legal standard under which countries may give
effect to their own laws by complying with U.S. laws. Where foreign
ownership laws meet the McClain requirements, such a country may
pursue civil recovery of cultural material in U.S. courts. For exam-
ple, in two 1981 cases involving the attempted import of Peruvian pre-
Columbian artifacts, the McClain theory enabled Peru to demonstrate
its legal ownership and recover the objects. In neither case was a
criminal charge under NSPA brought against the dealers involved. 198
Thus, McClain furthers the traditional U.S. objective of helping own-
ers recover their art. McClain also bolsters the force of the bilateral
agreements, which mandate U.S. efforts to help the countries involved
recover stolen property. Where, as in the Peruvian cases, the nation
has a valid ownership law, McClain's legal confirmation that a country
owns its art even without possession helps the country establish its
legal claim and allows the United States to honor its bilateral
agreements. 199
The NSPA under McClain also strengthens the goals of the
CPIA. The CPIA expresses the U.S. policy of deterring the pillage of
194. See id.
195. See Bator, supra note 1, at 354.
196. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979). See Bator, supra note 1, at 282.
197. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 102 (testimony of Douglas Ewing).
198. Truslow, Peru's Recovery of Cultural Patrimony, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.,
839, 849-50 (1983).
199. See id. at 850; see also Hearings on S. 605, supra note 9 (testimony of Ely Maurer).
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archaeological sites.200 The existence of a U.S. criminal sanction
which applies to the theft of such property furthers the U.S. commit-
ment to preserve the integrity of these sites. Specifically, the NSPA
reinforces the CPIA's ban on cultural property stolen from museums
or similar institutions, for it applies criminal sanctions to all such sto-
len property valued over $5000.201 The symbolic force of McClain is
also an important factor. The potential for criminal enforcement may
deter the importation of stolen art.
2. The Deflection Argument
Besides the threat of criminal prosecution under the NSPA, deal-
ers fear that enforcement of U.S. law will cause an embargo on the
importation of illicitly obtained art into the United States, without
similar action by other countries. As a result, the market will simply
be deflected elsewhere. 202 It is difficult to calculate the extent to which
this may be true because data is scarce, fragmentary, and difficult to
evaluate.20 3 Many experts believe, however, that the pre-Columbian
statute has had some effect in preventing the dismemberment of stelae
and large monumental art.2° 4 At the same time, the theft of smaller
pre-Columbian objects has increased greatly.20 5 To preservationists,
this increased theft of movable art indicates a need for more effective
enforcement and control.
20 6
200. See supra notes 57-80 and accompanying text.
201. See 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982).
202. "[U]nderground collections generally do not end up in the public museums; they
are enjoyed by a wealthy elite.... The trade in cultural property ... does not end, it
simply finds other channels .. " Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 123 (testimony of
Thomas Solley, Director, Indiana Univ. Art Museum); "Unquestionably, the United States
unilateral action would surely be tilting at windmills. We would close our border to art
objects; they would merely find their way to Swiss collections or Japanese museums or
German institutions." Hearing on H. R. 5643, supra note 156, at 47 (testimony of Douglas
Ewing, in opposition to the Cultural Property Implementation Bill); "Foreign dealers
would undoubtedly choose to sell to Swiss, German, Japanese, or indeed, clients of any
nation other than the United States. Id. at 49; (testimony of Alan Brandt). See also
Emmerich, supra note 70, at 111.
203. S. REP. No. 564, supra note 146, at 23; Bator, supra note 1, at 289-94. One
museum representative notes that most looted art goes to private collections, making it
especially difficult to evaluate the deflection argument. Telephone interviews with Ellen
Herscher, Program Coordinator, American Association of Museums (March 10, 1985).
204. See Bator, supra note 1, at 334-35 & n.100.
205. Bator, supra note 1, at 334 & n. 101. "Clemency Coggins, a scholar of pre-Colum-
bian archaeology at the Peabody Museum in Cambridge, Mass., said a United States law
passed in 1973 [sic] [the Pre-Columbian Act of 1972] prohibited the import of large works
such as murals and relief sculptures, causing a rise in the traffic of smaller, more portable
items, which is not yet controlled by law." N.Y.Times, Dec. 26, 1985, at C28, col. 2.
206. Wolf, Emerging U.S. Policy With Regard to the International Movement of National
Cultural Property, 7 INT'L TRADE L. J., 175 (1982). See N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1985, at
C28, col. 2. "The international trade in stolen pre-Columbian artifacts is among the most
active of the illegal art markets, several experts said yesterday." Id. Experts interviewed
included Bonnie Burnham, Director, World Monument Foundation, formerly Director,
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Where U.S. statutes, bilateral agreements, and foreign export con-
trols successfully inhibit the importation of stolen art into the United
States, some of it is likely to be deflected to other art-importing coun-
tries. The United States, however, is the major market for this art.
20 7
Laws of supply and demand suggest that if the U.S. market is cut off,
prices will fall, dampening illicit supply. Elimination of a major mar-
ket should decrease the trade in stolen art. In any case, the deflection
argument rests on a narrow conception of U.S. interest in preserving
its share of the illicit art trade.208 Such a parochial view should not
prevail over the larger consideration of global cultural preservation
that favors implementation of complementary U.S. measures to con-
trol the pillage of national patrimonies.
B. THE CONSISTENCY OF U.S. EFFORTS TO
PRESERVE CULTURAL PATRIMONY
The U.S. efforts to protect cultural property from theft and pil-
lage are complementary. While each means of control is limited in
scope and effect, in combination they increase the possibility of con-
trol. The deterrent effect of the NSPA supplements the force of the
U.S. policy in the CPIA. The various remedies all address the same
global problem. To oppose "unilateral" in favor of "multilateral" ini-
tiatives is a meaningless exercise in semantics. The "unilateral" Pre-
Columbian Act helps a group of Latin American nations retain their
archaeological monuments. The bilateral agreements involve interna-
tional cooperation. The CPIA offers bilateral, multilateral, and unilat-
eral approaches, all to attain a common objective. Those who criticize
International Foundation for Art Research and Clemency Coggins, Professor of Archaeol-
ogy, Harvard University. Id.
207. S. REP. No. 564, supra note 148, at 23 (emphasizes the urgency of passing the
CPIA, "because the United States is a principal market.. ."); "The USIA is convinced that
the United States is by far the greatest market for [archaeological cultural property] espe-
cially from Central and South America and Canada." Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9
(testimony of Thomas Harvey, General Counsel and Congressional Liaison of U.S.I.A.).
The pillage of Canadian sites also suggests that the United States continues to be a major
terminus for stolen artifacts. David Walden of the Department of Communications in
Ottawa, commenting that trade in Canadian artifacts is a major problem, describes "an
active U.S. market where dealers openly-and legally-offer high prizes for stolen Cana-
dian artifacts." MACLEAN'S, Oct. 28, 1985, col. 2. It is legal to sell artifacts in the United
States which have been successfully smuggled out of Canada. This illustrates the distinc-
tion between "illegal export" and "theft." Since Canada does not have a national owner-
ship law, artifacts looted from Canada are not considered "stolen" under the NSPA.
Canada has become the first nation to invoke the CPIA to control this trade. Walden
claimed U. S. dealers "encourage criminal elements here in Canada to loot and plunder
archaeological sites." Id.
208. See Symposium: Legal Aspects of the International Traffic in Stolen Art, 4 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 51, 127 (1967); S. REP. No. 564, supra note 148, at 23; H. REP.
No. 615, supra note 148, at 4; see also Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 41 (testimony of
Ely Maurer); Replies, supra note 122.
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U.S. application of the NSPA to protect foreign cultural property as a
"unilateral" initiative should recognize that ARPA, a "unilateral"
U.S. statute, seeks the same protection for U.S. archaeological sites.
20 9
Important policy considerations support the pluralistic U.S.
approach to the control of pillage. Many of the countries which are
suffering erosion of their cultural patrimony and for which the NSPA
under McClain provides potential assistance are also treaty partners
with the United States in the UNESCO Convention.210 A statutory
repeal of the McClain decision would signal a significant reversal of
U.S. policy toward the protection of cultural property. 21" At present,
the United States can claim a leadership role as the first major art-
importing nation to join the UNESCO Convention. U.S. endorsement
of the Convention has already produced some public benefit at home
in easing restrictions for foreign exhibits to U.S. museums. 212 The
U.S. desire, encouraged by art dealers, to liberalize export restrictions
and to promote cultural exchange can only be realized if the countries
who are concerned about the fate of their art see the United States as a
genuine ally.2 1 3 It would also be incongruous for the United States to
prosecute individuals for trafficking in archaeological materials illicitly
taken from public and Indian lands at home while refusing to honor
the efforts of other countries which seek to prevent similar destruction
to their sites.214
U.S. efforts to control the illicit art trade also have larger policy
implications. Diplomatic relations depend on cooperation in many
areas. The U.S. seeks accord with other countries in economic, mili-
tary, and cultural matters in an increasingly interdependent world.
215
The CPIA's legislative history expresses U.S. awareness that laws to
prevent the destruction of archaeological sites and the looting of arti-
facts enhance our relations with the countries of origin, many of
209. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa.-ll. (1985).
210. These countries include Canada, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 4.
211. Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 41 (testimony of Ely Maurer).
212. See Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 153 (testimony of Maureen Robinson).
213. See, e.g., Truslow, supra note 198:
Development of an appropriate, flexible and cooperative policy toward foreign
museums and collectors which recognizes and supports the terms of Peruvian law
and the pride of its people, will be a far more subtle task. The chances, however,
that Peru will be willing to adopt cooperative and flexible policies without feeling
that such policies jeopardize its national objectives is greatly enhanced if its rights
are acknowledged and its laws respected by other nations.
Id. at 853.
214. Letter from Secretary of the Interior to Senator Strom Thurmond (undated);
Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 57 (testimony of Richard H. Abbey, James Knapp).
215. See Hearing on S. 605, supra note 9, at 41 (testimony of Ely Maurer).
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whom are close allies. 216 As Congress noted in rejecting the position
of dealers opposed to an earlier version of the CPIA:
the United States, as the major art-importing nation in the world [should] exer-
cise moral leadership .... While United States action alone will not eliminate
pillage or prevent illicit traffic in antiquities, closing the American art market
to illegal trade should create a significant deterrent and meaningful step toward
international cooperative efforts to meet an increasingly serious problem of
preserving and protecting national cultural heritage.
2 17
The Senate rested its support of the final Cultural Property Bill "on
grounds of principle, good foreign relations, and concern for the pres-
ervation of the cultural heritage of mankind.
'218
CONCLUSION
The NSPA and the CPIA derive from a consistent U.S. policy to
alleviate pillage and preserve cultural patrimony abroad and at home.
Complementary statutes, the NSPA and the CPIA define U.S. law and
the conditions for its enforcement. The NSPA discourages theft and
assists in the return of stolen property. It also supports the commit-
ment of the CPIA to preserve global archaelogical sites and deter loot-
ing. The NSPA under McClain and the CPIA both protect cultural
materials that are in jeopardy. The NSPA honors the valid ownership
laws of foreign countries, while the CPIA may lead to U.S. import
controls to protect the archaeological materials of these countries from
destruction. The CPIA, the NSPA under McClain, the Pre-Colum-
bian Act, the bilateral agreements, and ARPA all reveal the consis-
tency of U.S. policy and reflect a firm U.S. commitment to
international preservation of cultural patrimony.
Barbara B. Rosecrance
216. See id. Mark Feldman, the State Department representative at the time of the
CPIA's passing, stated:
[G]overnment is not and should not be immune to pressures relating to other
important United States interests. Our relations with various countries are a tapes-
try of many interests. For example, we have an agreement with Mexico for the
reciprocal recovery of stolen automobiles. Back in 1969, Mexico told us in fairly
blunt terms that a similar arrangement should be considered for cultural property,
or they might not be able to continue the law enforcement cooperation.
Proceedings of the Panel on the U. S. Enabling Legislation of the UNESCO Convention oi
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Owner-
ship of Cultural Property, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 97, 105 (1976).
217. H.R. REP. No. 615, supra note 148, at 4.
218. S. REP. No. 564, supra note 148, at 23.
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